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BEHIND ENEMY PHONE LINES:  
INSIDER TRADING, PARALLEL ENFORCEMENT, 
AND SHARING THE FRUITS OF WIRETAPS 
Alexandra N. Mogul* 
 
Two key trends were present in the successful prosecution of Raj 
Rajaratnam and his coconspirators in one of the largest insider-trading 
conspiracies in history:  the use of wiretaps to investigate and prosecute 
insider trading and a joint effort between the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct the 
investigation.  Despite the close working relationship between the DOJ and 
the SEC, the DOJ never disclosed the fruits of the wiretaps to the SEC, 
presumably due to its belief that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968 (as amended, the “Wiretap Act”)—the 
comprehensive framework that authorizes the government to conduct 
wiretaps in certain circumstances—prohibited it from doing so. 
Though the Second Circuit in SEC v. Rajaratnam ultimately held that the 
SEC could obtain wiretap materials from the criminal defendants as part of 
civil discovery, the question of whether direct disclosure of the wiretap 
materials from the DOJ to the SEC is prohibited has been raised but not yet 
addressed.  This Note analyzes previous cases addressing the construction 
of the Wiretap Act’s disclosure provisions and concludes that direct 
disclosure from the DOJ to the SEC is not prohibited by the Act.  It further 
proposes a process by which civil enforcement agencies, such as the SEC, 
can request disclosure of wiretap materials through the DOJ in such a way 
that balances the benefits of disclosure against the privacy interests of the 
parties whose conversations were intercepted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout American history, criminal organizations—from prohibition-
era bootleggers and the mid-century mafia to drug-dealing street gangs and 
present-day Cosa Nostra—all have used secret, coded communications to 
conduct their operations.1  And today, white-collar criminals are the newest 
players in the world of organized crime.  Insider-trading conspirators have 
resorted to tactics similar to those used in organized crime, such as holding 
secret meetings, using burner phones,2 establishing secret codes, and 
providing cash kickbacks to those willing to assist the Wall Street mob.3  
 
 1. See ANTHONY A. ALBERTI, WIRETAPS:  A COMPLETE GUIDE FOR THE LAW AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROFESSIONAL 5 (1999). 
 2. This is a term used to describe cell phones that are disposed of frequently so as to 
throw off investigators. See Matthew DeVoy Jones, The “Orwellian Consequence” of 
Smartphone Tracking:  Why a Warrant Under the Fourth Amendment Is Required Prior to 
Collection of GPS Data from Smartphones, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 211, 211–12 (2014). 
 3. SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Case, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2007, 5:03 
PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/03/01/sec-insidertrading-idUKN01350020070301 
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As Wall Street criminals mimic mob techniques, the government has begun 
treating them accordingly.  Indeed, Preet Bharara, the United States 
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, has stated that the 
government is now “targeting white-collar insider trading rings with the 
same powerful investigative tools that have worked so successfully against 
the mob and drug cartels”—that is, wiretaps.4 
This novel use of wiretaps came to light in the recent prosecution of Raj 
Rajaratnam, his hedge fund Galleon Group, and his coconspirators for their 
involvement in a massive insider-trading scheme.5  Over the course of three 
years, the Department of Justice6 (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission7 (SEC) targeted Rajaratnam, his associates, and his hedge fund 
for allegedly engaging in a network of shared inside information, enabling 
the participants in this network to reap millions of dollars on illicit trades.8  
After finding that traditional investigative methods were inadequate to 
establish sufficient evidence of such insider-trading conspiracies, the 
government resorted to the use of wiretaps.9  As a result of the substantial 
evidence of criminal activity uncovered by the wiretaps, the United States 
Attorney’s Office10 (USAO) for the Southern District of New York charged 
and successfully prosecuted numerous people for securities fraud.11  In 
addition to criminal charges, the SEC successfully brought civil 
 
[http://perma.cc/V6XN-6J2P]; Shane Miller, Note, Drawing the Line:  The Legality of Using 
Wiretaps to Investigate Insider Trading, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 6 (2013). 
 4. Jordan Maglich, Once Reserved for Drug Crimes, Wiretapping Takes Center Stage 
in White Collar Prosecutions, FORBES (May 21, 2013, 11:32 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/jordanmaglich/2013/05/21/once-reserved-for-drug-crimes-wiretapping-takes-center-
stage-in-white-collar-prosecutions (“However, it was authorities’ decision to employ 
wiretaps in an insider-trading case that would mark the beginning of an unparalleled and 
aggressive entrance of wiretaps into white-collar crime jurisprudence.”) [http://perma. 
cc/59JY-R24F].  “Wiretapping” is defined as “[e]lectronic or mechanical eavesdropping, 
[usually] done by law-enforcement officers under court order, to listen to private 
conversations.” Wiretapping, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 5. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013); Peter Lattman, 
Galleon Chief Sentenced to 11-Year Term in Insider Case, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:18 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/rajaratnam-is-sentenced-to-11-years/?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/HT6Z-VMYC]; Maglich, supra note 4. See generally J. Scott Colesanti, 
Wall Street As Yossarian:  The Other Effects of the Rajaratnam Insider Trading Conviction, 
40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 411 (2011) (discussing the effects of the Rajaratnam conviction on the 
“government’s ongoing crusade against insider trading”). 
 6. The mission of the DOJ is  
[t]o enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States according to the 
law; to ensure public safety against threats foreign and domestic; to provide federal 
leadership in preventing and controlling crime; to seek just punishment for those 
guilty of unlawful behavior; and to ensure fair and impartial administration of 
justice for all Americans. 
About, U.S. DEP’T JUST. http://www.justice.gov/about (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/GWH3-G2JS]. 
 7. See Colesanti, supra note 5, at 416. 
 8. See Lattman, supra note 5. 
 9. Miller, supra note 3, at 6. 
 10. The USAO is the prosecutorial agency of the DOJ, responsible for bringing criminal 
cases on behalf of the federal government. Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 
http://www.justice.gov/agencies (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/G57M-662C]. 
 11. See Lattman, supra note 5. 
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enforcement actions against Rajaratnam, Galleon Group, and other 
coconspirators, recovering tens of millions of dollars in civil penalties.12 
The Rajaratnam cases13 represent a coalescence of two trends in the 
investigation and prosecution of insider trading.  First, the DOJ and the 
SEC engaged in a joint or parallel investigation into the insider-trading 
activities of the conspirators.14  Criminal investigators have increasingly 
engaged the help and expertise of administrative agencies, such as the SEC, 
charged with the civil enforcement of shared statutory provisions and 
related regulations.15  These investigations may involve joint interviews, 
depositions, and status conferences, and they occasionally involve such an 
open flow of information between the two agencies that they trigger 
additional Brady16 requirements.17  Second, the criminal case against 
Rajaratnam was the first time that wiretaps were used as evidence in an 
insider-trading prosecution, and it has opened the door to the use of wiretap 
information in future insider-trading investigations.18 
But what happens when these two trends converge?  Can the DOJ share 
the fruits of wiretaps with administrative agencies as part of the 
increasingly open discourse between the two entities, in light of Title III of 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act19 (“Title III” or “the 
 
 12. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Record $92.8 Million Penalty Against Raj 
Rajaratnam (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm [http:// 
perma.cc/BKK3-ESNL]. 
 13. I use the term “cases” to refer to the fact that not all of the coconspirators were 
charged under the same docket and that the criminal cases brought by the USAO are separate 
from the enforcement actions brought by the SEC. 
 14. See Colesanti, supra note 5, at 416. 
 15. Mary Jo White, Chairwoman, SEC, All-Encompassing Enforcement:  The Robust 
Use of Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541342996#.VAp5t7xdW50 (noting 
that the number of criminal cases related to SEC proceedings has doubled since 1993, and 
the number of times where the SEC grants other law enforcement authorities access to its 
files—“a rough proxy for the number of cases where [there are] parallel investigations—has 
also more than doubled”) [http://perma.cc/2ANL-8R62]; see also, e.g., Richard A. Goodman 
et al., Forensic Epidemiology:  Law at the Intersection of Public Health and Criminal 
Investigations, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 684, 684 (2003) (discussing parallel investigations 
between public health agencies and law enforcement authorities); Mark D. Hunter, SEC/DOJ 
Parallel Proceedings:  Contemplating the Propriety of Recent Judicial Trends, 68 MO. L. 
REV. 149 (2003) (discussing parallel investigations between the SEC and the DOJ); infra 
Part I.B.1 (discussing the shared law enforcement authority between the DOJ and the SEC). 
 16. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring the government to disclose any 
exculpatory evidence in its possession to the defendant). 
 17. See, e.g., United States v. Martoma, 990 F. Supp. 2d 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding 
that in a parallel investigation between the USAO and the SEC, materials in the sole 
possession of the SEC are subject to disclosure to the defense in accordance with Brady 
requirements); United States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (same). 
 18. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Kenneth M. 
Breen & Sean T. Haran, The Rise of Wiretaps and Government Eavesdropping in Securities 
Fraud Cases, 35 CHAMPION 43, 45 (2011) (“The government’s victory in Rajaratnam will 
likely embolden its efforts to use wiretaps to investigate insider trading, and the Second 
Circuit’s views on Raj Rajaratnam’s appeals on the wiretap suppression issues will be 
followed closely by the defense bar.”); Maglich, supra note 4. 
 19. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006)). 
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Wiretap Act”)—the statutory framework authorizing the government to 
conduct wiretaps?20 
This question remains unresolved by the circuit courts that have been 
presented with it,21 and it has yet to reach the Supreme Court.22  However, 
with the increased prosecution of insider trading,23 the anticipated increase 
in the use of wiretaps to investigate and prosecute these crimes,24 and the 
continuing use of parallel investigations to investigate securities fraud,25 it 
is only a matter of time before the question will need to be resolved. 
Drawing on traditional tools of statutory interpretation, this Note 
examines whether the Wiretap Act permits the DOJ to directly disclose the 
fruits of lawfully intercepted wiretaps to the SEC.  Further, this Note 
examines whether policy dictates that they should be able to do so.  Part I of 
this Note provides an overview of the key tools of statutory interpretation 
relevant to the different readings of the Wiretap Act, the special relationship 
between the DOJ and the SEC with respect to the enforcement of the 
securities laws, and the history and relevant provisions of the Wiretap Act.  
Part II begins with an examination of the different ways that circuit courts 
have interpreted the disclosure provisions of Title III with respect to civil 
enforcement agencies.  It then addresses the policy issues surrounding the 
normative question of whether the DOJ should be allowed to share the 
fruits of wiretaps with the SEC during a parallel or joint investigation.  Part 
III argues that, based on the common application of traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation, the Wiretap Act does not prohibit the DOJ from 
sharing the fruits of wiretaps with civil enforcement agencies such as the 
SEC.  This Note concludes with a proposed process by which civil 
enforcement agencies, such as the SEC, can request disclosure of wiretap 
materials in a way that balances the dual goals of the Wiretap Act. 
 
 20. See infra Part I.C (discussing relevant provisions of Title III, the comprehensive 
statutory framework governing the government’s use of wiretaps to investigate certain 
crimes). 
 21. See infra Part II.A; see, e.g., SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(refusing to address whether the USAO could provide wiretap conversations to the SEC 
without any law enforcement purpose and solely to assist the SEC in a civil case); Resha v. 
United States, 767 F.2d 285, 287–88 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding it unnecessary to address the 
question on the limits of the disclosure provisions of Title III); Fleming v. United States, 547 
F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1977) (“The statute provides no ready answer to the important issue 
of the extent to which information developed through wiretaps as part of criminal 
investigations can be disclosed to the Internal Revenue Service for use in civil tax 
proceedings.  We decline to resolve the statutory ambiguities, for we find that whatever the 
exact scope of the statutory provisions, the evidence was properly admitted under the 
circumstances here.”). 
 22. See Andrew P. Atkins, New Methods of Financial White-Collar Criminal 
Investigation and Prosecution:  The Spillover of Wiretaps to Civil Enforcement Proceedings, 
33 PACE L. REV. 716, 729 (2013). 
 23. See, e.g., Patrick Craine & Lashon Kell, Prosecuting Insider Trading:  Recent 
Developments and Novel Approaches, 59 ADVOCATE (TEXAS) 45, 47 (2012); Maglich, supra 
note 4 (“The SEC has filed more insider trading cases in the past three years than any three-
year period in history, and criminal authorities have obtained more than seventy convictions.  
Authorities have seized on this momentum, and many more cases are expected.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 22, at 744–45; Craine & Kell, supra note 23, at 47–48. 
 25. See White, supra note 15. 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE:  PARALLEL INVESTIGATIONS 
AND THE DUAL MISSION OF THE WIRETAP ACT 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act outlines a 
detailed framework for both the interception of wire communications and 
the disclosure of the materials intercepted.  However, circuit courts have 
interpreted these provisions differently, leading to varying outcomes.  To 
assist in the analysis of whether Title III permits the DOJ to share the fruits 
of wiretaps with the SEC, Part I.A provides an overview of some tools of 
statutory interpretation, including the key tools used in various courts’ 
constructions of Title III.  Part I.B then discusses the relationship between 
the DOJ and the SEC—the two key agencies responsible for the 
enforcement of the securities laws—and how this relationship lends itself to 
parallel investigations.  Finally, Part I.C discusses the background leading 
up to the enactment of Title III, as well as the provisions of Title III most 
relevant to this Note’s analysis. 
A.  Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
The question of whether the Wiretap Act permits the DOJ to share the 
fruits of wiretaps with the SEC in the course of a parallel investigation boils 
down to a question of statutory interpretation.  As such, an understanding of 
the tools and methods used by courts to interpret statutes is necessary. 
Courts have long and consistently held that statutory interpretation begins 
with the text of the statute itself.26  As such, courts should ascribe the words 
of a statute with their ordinary meaning.27  If the language of the actual text 
is unclear or ambiguous, then courts may employ additional tools of 
interpretation, known as “the canons of construction,” to derive meaning 
from the text.28 
 
 26. See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (“As in all 
statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the statute.”); Victoria F. Nourse, 
A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation:  Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE 
L.J. 70, 89–90 (2012) (noting that all statutory theories start with the text when engaging in 
statutory interpretation); see also Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory 
Interpretation:  Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 
1750, 1761 (2010) (discussing how courts may differ in the emphasis placed on the various 
tools of statutory interpretation). 
 27. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1165 (2014) (“In determining the meaning of 
a statutory provision, ‘we look first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary 
meaning.’” (quoting Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990))); In re New York 
Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(interpreting provisions of the Wiretap Act “in light of their ordinary meaning and their 
contextual setting”).  However, different schools of interpretation may differ in the tools 
used to establish ordinary meaning. Compare Gluck, supra note 26 (suggesting that not all 
courts would first examine a term’s dictionary definition), with Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public 
Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 715, 771 (2013) (“[A] 
court always must start with the text of a statute and give its terms their ordinary, dictionary 
meaning.” (citing Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355–56 (2005))). 
 28. United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387, 404 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Only if we 
conclude that statutory language is ambiguous ‘do we resort . . . to canons of construction 
and, if the meaning remains ambiguous, to legislative history.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2006))); Nourse, supra note 
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Canons of construction are judge-made maxims designed to assist with 
statutory interpretation by promoting consistency among judicial decision 
makers.29  Though the canons of construction are not without their critics 
(and a considerable amount of academia has focused on rebutting or 
refining the canons),30 courts continue to employ them.31  One canon in 
particular has been instrumental in some circuits’ interpretation of Title III’s 
disclosure provisions:  expressio unius est exclusio alterius or, simply, 
expressio unius.32 
Expressio unius means the “inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of 
the other.”33  Take, for example the following hypothetical statute, stating:  
“Grocery stores may sell beer and wine.”  A strict expressio unius reading 
of this statute would find that grocery stores may sell only beer and wine 
and are prohibited from selling anything else, because the statute does not 
explicitly say that the grocery store can sell other products.34  But surely the 
legislature did not intend to forbid grocery stores from selling other 
products, such as food and nonalcoholic beverages.35  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court has long held “that the expressio unius canon does not apply 
‘unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed 
 
26, at 137 (“If a court does not use legislative history, it uses something else to resolve 
ambiguity, whether canons of interpretation, prior precedent, or other statutes . . . .”). 
 29. See, e.g., CBS Inc. v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1225 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“Canons of construction are essentially tools which help [the court] determine 
whether the meaning of a statutory provision is sufficiently plain, in light of the text of the 
statute as a whole, to avoid the need to consider extrinsic evidence of Congress’ intent.”); 
see also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Making Laws Moral:  A Defense of Substantive Canons of 
Construction, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 915, 918 (proposing that judges can “resolve hard cases of 
statutory interpretation and maintain their legitimacy by developing substantive canons of 
construction”). 
 30. For further reading on these criticisms, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW 
TRADITION:  DECIDING APPEALS (1960) (arguing that canons are not necessarily 
determinative of any outcome because every canon can be countered by an equal and 
opposite counter-canon); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 405, 462–505 (1989) (proposing “interpretive principles” to determine which 
canon should be applied in a given situation). See also Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s 
Selective Canons of Statutory Construction:  Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative 
Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 603–08 (1998) (examining 
Professor Sunstein’s interpretive principles). 
 31. See, e.g., Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2441 (2014) 
(discussing the canon that “words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view 
to their place in the overall statutory scheme”); Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 
1166, 1175–76 (2013) (applying the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius); RadLAX 
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) (discussing the 
general/specific canon); Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–82 (2005) (applying the canon 
of constitutional avoidance). 
 32. See infra Part II.A.2–3. 
 33. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 824 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 34. See id. 
 35. Indeed, the canon of construction called the “absurdity doctrine” permits judges to 
deviate from even the most unambiguous statutory text if such a direct interpretation would 
lead to “absurd results.” John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 
2388–90 (2003).  It would certainly be absurd to prohibit a grocery store from selling 
nonalcoholic beverages. 
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possibility and meant to say no to it.’”36  Given the unlikelihood that 
Congress considered the sale of nonalcoholic beverages and intended to 
prohibit it, expressio unius should not be used to interpret the statute.  
Additionally, expressio unius should not be applied where “Congress has 
‘an obvious reason for selecting the [examples] that are addressed’ in the 
statute[] and omitting others.”37  Because “beer and wine” are alcoholic 
beverages, the sale of which tends to be highly regulated, it is obvious why 
there was a need to expressly authorize grocery stores to sell beer and wine.  
As such, expressio unius should not be used to interpret the statute. 
B.  The Special Relationship Between the DOJ and the SEC 
The DOJ and the SEC enjoy a particularly unique relationship as law 
enforcement agencies tasked with enforcing the same securities laws, 
though in different capacities.  This part of the Note discusses how the 
structure of the securities laws creates an attractive environment for the use 
of parallel or joint investigations between the two agencies.  It then 
discusses the benefits of joint investigations and how they are increasingly 
used between the DOJ and the SEC. 
1.  Shared Law Enforcement Authority of Section 10(b) 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193438 (“the Exchange 
Act”) governs securities fraud.  It makes it “unlawful for any person . . . [t]o 
use any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security” in violation of an SEC 
regulation.39  The section also authorizes the SEC to promulgate rules and 
regulations that are “necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.”40  Thus, the criminal and civil enforcement of 
securities fraud is inherently intertwined, given that a criminal violation of 
section 10(b) requires a violation of an SEC rule.41 
Pursuant to section 10(b)’s authorization, the SEC promulgated SEC 
Rule 10b-5 to address securities fraud42 and 10b5-1 to more specifically 
address insider trading.43  Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any person, 
 
 36. Marx, 133 S. Ct. at 1175 (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 
(2003)). 
 37. Figueroa v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 715 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (quoting Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1469 (2012)). 
 38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). 
 39. Id. (emphasis added). 
 40. Id.  Section 10(b) covers cases of insider trading. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 
U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (finding that where there is “a duty to disclose arising from a 
relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction,” “silence in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities” may constitute fraud under section 10(b)). 
 41. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Steve Thel, Taking Section 10(b) Seriously:  Criminal 
Enforcement of SEC Rules, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (“[A]bsent a[n SEC] rule, 
section 10(b) does not prohibit anything.  Even when there is a rule, it is the rule that 
prohibits conduct—section 10(b) does not come into play unless some conduct violates a 
rule.”). 
 42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015). 
 43. Id. § 240.10b5-1. 
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directly or indirectly, to engage in fraudulent activity in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security.44  Rule 10b5-1 further provides guidance 
as to what constitutes certain elements of the crime of insider trading.45 
But being two separate entities with two distinct charters—one a law 
enforcement agency with the authorization to imprison convicted criminals 
and the other a civil enforcement agency with the ability to bring civil 
actions on behalf of the public—the DOJ and the SEC can avail themselves 
of very different tools when conducting their investigations.  The DOJ has 
the ability to execute search warrants, conduct undercover operations, 
and—pursuant to the Wiretap Act—execute wiretaps.46  As a civil 
enforcement agency, however, the SEC has the ability to issue formal 
orders of investigation47 and subpoenas;48 but unlike the DOJ, the SEC 
does not have authority to conduct wiretaps.49  Initially, the SEC’s primary 
means of enforcement was its authority to obtain injunctive relief; however, 
the SEC’s enforcement authority was expanded greatly by a 1990 
amendment to the Exchange Act, which authorized the SEC to seek civil 
money penalties in administrative enforcement actions against regulated 
entities and people associated with those entities.50  The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“the Dodd-Frank 
Act”) further expanded this authority by permitting the SEC to seek civil 
penalties against all persons in administrative enforcement proceedings, not 
just those associated with regulated entities.51 
Though the SEC does not have the authority to bring criminal actions, the 
SEC can facilitate criminal investigations by referring its cases to the 
 
 44. Id. § 240.10b-5.  Fraudulent activities include “employ[ing] any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud,” “mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact or [] omit[ting] to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,” or “engag[ing] in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.” Id. 
 45. See id. § 240.10b5-1. 
 46. See infra Part I.C.2.a. 
 47. See SEC DIV. OF ENF’T, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 17 (2015), http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf [http://perma.cc/D4UT-R7BL]. 
 48. See id. at 40; see also Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Enforcement Division Granted 
Permanent Subpoena Powers, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/11/AR2010081106274.html [http://perma.cc/A39P-
4MCG]. 
 49. See White, supra note 15. 
 50. Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, § 201, 104 Stat. 931, 935 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3) (2012)); see also Thel, 
supra note 41, at 10; GIBSON DUNN, THE DODD-FRANK ACT REINFORCES AND EXPANDS SEC 
ENFORCEMENT POWERS (2010), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Dodd-
FrankActReinforcesAndExpandsSECEnforcementPowers.aspx [http://perma.cc/9CGD-
XX2J].  Prior to 1990, the SEC could only obtain civil money penalties in a proceeding 
before a district judge, rather than in a civil enforcement proceeding. ALAN J. BRUDNER, 
HOWARD M. PRIVETTE & ADAM D. SCHNEIR, PAUL HASTINGS LLP, STAY CURRENT:  A 
CLIENT ALERT FROM PAUL HASTINGS:  FINANCIAL REFORM EXPANDS SEC ENFORCEMENT 
AUTHORITY 1 (2010), http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1684.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/48KB-U4NS]. 
 51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 § 929P, 15 
U.S.C. § 77t (2012); see also GIBSON DUNN, supra note 50. 
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appropriate criminal enforcement authorities.52  Indeed, when the SEC 
subpoenas a witness to testify before the SEC, the SEC routinely provides 
the witness with a form, “Form 1662,” expressly notifying the recipient that 
the SEC “often makes its files available to other governmental agencies, 
particularly the United States Attorneys and state prosecutors [and t]here is 
a likelihood that information supplied by [the testifying witness] will be 
made available to such agencies where appropriate.”53  Thus, it is clear that 
despite the differing authorities of the DOJ and the SEC, their activities and 
investigations are often interrelated. 
2.  Benefits and Trends of Parallel Proceedings 
Given the joint jurisdiction between the DOJ and the SEC to prosecute 
securities fraud criminally and civilly, respectively, the two agencies often 
engage in parallel investigations and proceedings.  Parallel proceedings 
have been defined as “simultaneous, adjudicative proceedings that (1) arise 
out of a single set of transactions, and (2) are directed against the same 
defendant or defendants.”54  In recent years, parallel proceedings have been 
formally established through task forces created by Presidents George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama to combat financial crime.55  Informally, many 
 
 52. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b); id. § 78u(d)(1); see United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 929, 933 
(9th Cir. 2008) (“Federal securities laws authorize the SEC to transmit evidence it has 
gathered to the USAO to facilitate a criminal investigation by the USAO.”); Anish Vashista, 
David R. Johnson & Muhtashem S. Choudhury, Securities Fraud, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
877, 932–37 (2005) (discussing referrals from the SEC to the DOJ as well as parallel and 
subsequent proceedings). 
 53. See Stringer, 535 F.3d at 934 (noting that Form 1662 is a routine form provided to 
witnesses subpoenaed by the SEC). 
 54. Hunter, supra note 15, at 149.  Recently, some courts have found that some parallel 
investigations have become so intertwined as to warrant classification as “joint 
investigations” and as such have extended the application of Brady disclosure requirements 
to materials held in the sole possession of the administrative agency. See, e.g., United States 
v. Martoma, No. 12 Cr. 973(PGG), 2014 WL 31704, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2014); United 
States v. Gupta, 848 F. Supp. 2d 491, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Where the USAO conducts a 
‘joint investigation’ with another state or federal agency, courts in this Circuit have held that 
the prosecutor’s duty extends to reviewing the materials in the possession of that other 
agency for Brady evidence.”); United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 
1994).  For the purposes of this Note, however, the distinction between “joint” and “parallel” 
proceedings is irrelevant. 
 55. President George W. Bush established the Corporate Fraud Task Force in 2002 as a 
joint effort by the DOJ, SEC, Commodity Futures Trade Commission (CFTC), and other 
agencies to combat financial crime. See Miheer Mhatre, Note, Parallel or Paralyzed?  
Sklena, Rule 804(B)(1), and the Costly Implications for Interagency Law Enforcement 
Efforts, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 546, 557–59.  President Obama established the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (FFETF) to reinvigorate the preceding Bush 
Administration’s task force and to hold accountable those responsible for the financial crisis. 
Id. at 558–59.  The FFETF is an interagency coalition of multiple federal departments, 
agencies and offices, including the DOJ and the SEC. See About the Task Force:  Task Force 
Members, FIN. FRAUD ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, www.stopfraud.gov/members.html (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/A744-C4AZ].  The FFETF is further broken down 
into multiple working groups, one of which is the Securities and Commodities Fraud 
Working Group, cochaired by a U.S. Attorney, an Assistant Attorney General for the 
Criminal Division of the DOJ, the Director of Enforcement for the CFTC, and the Director 
of Enforcement for the SEC. See About the Task Force:  Task Force Leadership, FIN. FRAUD 
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parallel investigations arise out of the shared statutory authority of the SEC 
and the DOJ to investigate and enforce the federal securities laws—in 
particular the laws and rules pursuant to section 10(b).56 
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently upheld the 
constitutionality of parallel investigations between criminal investigative 
agencies and civil enforcement agencies, as long as the agencies do not act 
in bad faith.57  Courts, however, have noted that agencies act in bad faith 
where an agency makes affirmative misrepresentations or uses the civil 
investigation as a subterfuge to obtain information solely for the purpose of 
the criminal investigation.58 
Traditionally, criminal investigations into insider trading stemmed from 
referrals from the SEC or other self-regulatory organizations, such as when 
SEC systems identify suspicious trading patterns.59  Insider-trading cases 
have historically been based on—and convictions have been obtained 
through—circumstantial evidence, such as trading records and call logs.60  
Prosecutors would present a timeline of suspicious activity (for example, 
the tipper comes out of a board meeting at 12 p.m., then makes a phone call 
to the alleged tippee at 12:02 p.m.), supplemented by trading records of the 
tippee’s transactions on the alleged inside information, followed by 
information of a substantial gain or loss avoidance on behalf of the tippee.61  
However, as the case against Rajaratnam shows, the government is now 
willing to undertake more aggressive investigative tactics to obtain more 
direct evidence of insider trading—tactics like wiretaps.62 
 
ENFORCEMENT TASK FORCE, www.stopfraud.gov/leadership.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/JWV9-BX3Z]. 
 56. See Thel, supra note 41; Mhatre, supra note 55, at 560–61; supra Part I.B.1 
(discussing the shared enforcement authority between the DOJ and the SEC). 
 57. See, e.g., United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 11 (1970); SEC v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 
628 F.2d 1368, 1376–77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc) (“Effective enforcement of the securities 
laws requires that the SEC and [DOJ] be able to investigate possible violations 
simultaneously.”); see also Panel:  The SEC’s Perspective, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 519, 
525–26 [hereinafter Panel I] (“That means that as long as [the SEC is] making decisions for 
[itself]—independent of the criminal interest—and [the SEC and the DOJ] do not use one 
another’s investigative powers and processes to advantage the other’s interest, then [the 
SEC’s actions] are okay.”). 
 58. See, e.g., Stringer, 535 F.3d at 937; United States v. Carriles, 486 F. Supp. 2d 599, 
615, 619 (W.D. Tex. 2007); United States v. Rand, 308 F. Supp. 1231, 1233, 1237 (N.D. 
Ohio 1970). 
 59. See Kenneth Herzinger & Mark Mermelstein, On Tap:  The Government’s Use of 
Wiretaps in Insider Trading Prosecutions Shows a Willingness to Use Nontraditional 
Methods of Investigation, L.A. LAW., April 2012, at 30, 32. 
 60. See id.; Panel:  A View from the Front Lines, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 463, 471–
72 [hereinafter Panel II]. 
 61. See Panel II, supra note 60, at 472.  A tipper is the party providing the inside 
information; a tippee is the party receiving the inside information. 
 62. See generally United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding 
the government’s use of wiretaps to investigate the defendant’s participation in an insider-
trading scheme). 
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C.  The Wiretap Act:  A Balancing Act 
The Communications Act of 1934 first addressed the interception of wire 
communications.63  Section 605 of this act “outlawed the interception [of 
wire communications] without authorization” as well as “the divulging or 
publishing of the contents of wiretaps.”64  However, after the Supreme 
Court’s rulings in Berger v. New York65 and Katz v. United States,66 both 
proponents and opponents of wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
“agree[d] that the present state of law in this area [was] extremely 
unsatisfactory” and that Congress needed “to clarify the resulting 
confusion.”67  Thus, the Wiretap Act was born.  This section begins with 
the history of the Wiretap Act, including the problems that it was intended 
to solve and its legislative history.  It then summarizes the relevant 
provisions of the Wiretap Act. 
1.  Balancing Individual Privacy with Investigative Value 
Originally passed by Congress as Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968,68 the Wiretap Act was enacted with a “dual 
purpose” to (1) protect against violations of individuals’ Fourth 
Amendment rights, and (2) provide the government with the authority to 
intercept wire communications in the course of certain criminal 
investigations.69  In 1986, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
(ECPA) amended Title III to address the interception of electronic 
communications in addition to wire communications.70 
 
 63. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–622 (2012)); see Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939) 
(holding that section 605 of the Communications Act prohibited the interception and 
divulgence of both interstate and intrastate telephone calls); see also S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 
67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154. 
 64. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 46 (1967) (discussing The Communications Act 
of 1934). See generally Weiss, 308 U.S. 321.  Title III amended the language of section 605 
of the Communications Act and narrowed its application by excluding “a law enforcement 
officer acting in the normal course of his duties” from the definition of “any person,” to 
which the section applies. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 108, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2197; see also 47 U.S.C. § 605 (“No person not being authorized by the sender shall 
intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, 
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.”). 
 65. 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (finding a New York statute authorizing wiretaps in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment, and delineating the constitutional criteria that electronic surveillance 
legislation should contain). 
 66. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending the protections of the Fourth Amendment to all 
areas where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 67. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153 (noting that 
the present status of wiretapping and electronic surveillance law is “intolerable”). 
 68. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522). 
 69. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 66, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
 70. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  The ECPA also included 
provisions known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA), which outlined the processes 
and procedures by which the government may access electronic communications in stored 
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The drafters of the Wiretap Act were concerned that technological 
developments had led to the widespread use and abuse of electronic 
surveillance, due to the newfound ease of intercepting communications.71  
They feared that this had upset commercial soundness by increasing 
commercial espionage and making it difficult to conduct business meetings 
in private.72  They also expressed concern that the intrusions did not stop at 
the commercial level, but also broke the barrier into individuals’ private 
lives by generally enabling “every spoken word relating to each man’s 
personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns [to] be 
intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker.”73 
At the same time, however, the drafters recognized that the structured, 
regulated use of wiretaps held significant value in one particular aspect of 
the criminal justice system:  organized crime.74  The framers of the act 
recognized that the structure of the criminal justice system was 
incompatible with the development of organized crime.75  Though laws 
existed to penalize such behavior, authorities found it difficult to 
meaningfully enforce them due to problems with gathering sufficient 
evidence.76  Investigations were unlikely to yield any willing witnesses, as 
“[i]nsiders are kept quiet by an ideology of silence underwritten by a fear, 
quite realistic, that death comes to him who talks.”77  And even when the 
authorities had found someone willing to talk in exchange for payment, the 
resulting information was often unreliable.78  Furthermore, traditional 
investigative tools, such as search warrants and subpoenas, proved 
ineffective because “organized crime groups do not keep books and records 
available for law enforcement inspection.”79 
The framers of the act recognized organized crime’s heightened reliance 
on in-person and phone communications to avoid “the possibility of loss or 
 
mediums such as emails, voice messages, and secondary information about communications 
like pen registers. Id. 
 71. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 67, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  The Supreme Court has interpreted the intentions of the framers of Title III with 
an emphasis toward the protection of privacy:  “[A]lthough Title III authorizes invasions of 
individual privacy under certain circumstances, the protection of privacy was an overriding 
congressional concern.” Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972). 
 74. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 70, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157. 
 75. Id. (“In our formative years, offenses usually occurred between 
neighbors. . . .  Ignored entirely in the development of our system of justice, therefore, was 
the possibility of the growth of a phenomenon such as modern organized crime with its 
attendant corruption [of] our political and law enforcement processes.”). 
 76. Id. at 73, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2160 (“The prohibitions of the criminal 
law are, in short, not self-executing.”).  Indeed, a 1967 report by the President’s Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (“the Presidential Commission”) found 
that organized crime was “continu[ing] to grow because of defects in the evidence gathering 
process.” Id. See also generally THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF 
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf [http://perma.cc/34LA-BT8N]. 
 77. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 73, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2160. 
 78. Id. at 72, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159. 
 79. Id. at 73, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2160. 
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seizure of an incriminating document.”80  But there was one tool that 
proved particularly successful in prosecuting these crimes:  wiretaps.81  
Former New York County District Attorney Frank Hogan testified before 
the Senate about the indispensability of wiretapping as a “weapon in the 
fight against organized crime,”82 noting its contribution to successful 
prosecutions of criminal enterprises in New York in prior years.83  
Consequently, Congress recognized the value that wiretaps possessed in the 
combat of organized crime84 and enacted the Wiretap Act on June 19, 
1968.85 
2.  The Act in Action 
The Wiretap Act outlines a broad regulatory framework for the 
interception and disclosure of wire, electronic, and oral communications, 
imposing greater limitations on the use of wiretaps than on other 
investigative tools due to the substantial privacy interests at stake.  Part 
I.B.2 of this Note discusses the procedural requirements to obtain court 
authorization to conduct wiretaps, the relevant provisions addressing the 
disclosure of wiretapped communications, and the use of such intercepted 
communications as evidence during trial. 
a.  Procedural Requirements 
In recognition of the privacy interests at stake, Title III permits wiretaps 
only in the course of investigations for certain serious offenses known as 
“predicate offenses,” which are outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.86  Included in 
this list are offenses historically prevalent in organized crime, including 
mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, bank fraud, and computer 
fraud.87  Notably absent from this enumeration of fraud-related crimes is 
securities fraud.88  However, if evidence of a nonpredicate offense is 
 
 80. Id. at 71, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159. 
 81. Id. at 72, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 72–73, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159–63. 
 84. Id. at 72–76, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2159–63. But see Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967) (noting that despite the Presidential Commission’s report, the 
court had found no empirical statistics on the use of electronic devices in the fight against 
organized crime). 
 85. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)). 
 86. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516.  Title III also allows for the investigations of certain state 
crimes to utilize wiretaps, so long as the state separately authorizes its use by statute. Id. 
§ 2516(2); see also Kyle G. Grimm, The Expanded Use of Wiretap Evidence in White-Collar 
Prosecutions:  Rebalancing Privacy Through More Vigorous Enforcement of the Predicate 
Offense Requirement and the Suppression Provisions of Title III, 33 PACE L. REV. 1146, 
1166 (2013). 
 87. 18 U.S.C. § 2516; see S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 97, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2186 (“Each offense has been chosen either because it is intrinsically serious or 
because it is characteristic of the operations of organized crime.”); Grimm, supra note 86, at 
1166. 
 88. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516. 
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revealed during the course of a lawful wiretap, the wiretap evidence of that 
second crime may still be admitted.89  This “plain-view exception” is 
codified in Title III and states that such information may be disclosed or 
used pursuant to the “law enforcement use”90 and “law enforcement 
disclosure”91 provisions, but disclosures pursuant to the “testimonial 
disclosure”92 provision are permitted only after a judge of competent 
jurisdiction rules that “the contents were otherwise intercepted in 
accordance with” Title III.93 
Section 2518, entitled “Procedure for interception of wire, oral, or 
electronic communications,” outlines, inter alia, the application 
requirements, the conditions that must be met before a judge grants such 
authorization, the required contents of the order, the amount of time the 
applicant has to conduct the wiretaps, and the post-interception procedural 
requirements.94  Applications must include, inter alia, the identity of the 
party making the request, a statement of facts justifying the applicant’s 
belief that a wiretap order should be issued, details regarding the particular 
offense being investigated, a description of the communications sought, and 
the identity, if known, of the party whose communications are sought.95  
The Wiretap Act then permits a judge to enter an ex parte order authorizing 
a wiretap, subject to some additional limitations, if the judge determines 
that, based on the facts included in the application, “there is probable cause 
for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit” a predicate offense, “there is probable cause for belief that 
particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through 
such interception,” and that “normal investigative procedures have been 
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried 
or to be too dangerous.”96 
 
 89. Id. § 2517(5); see United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184(RJH), 2010 WL 
4867402, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (finding that the government was permitted to use 
wiretaps to investigate fraudulent insider-trading activity using interstate wires because wire 
fraud is a permitted predicate offense subject to wiretaps). 
 90. See infra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 91. See infra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 92. See infra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5); see id. § 2517(1)–(2).  Critics of the plain-view exception 
argue that it has the potential for abuse, in that a purported investigation into a predicate 
offense may be used as a subterfuge to use wiretaps to investigate nonpredicate offenses. See 
Miller, supra note 3, at 9–10.  Indeed, Raj Rajaratnam raised this issue in his criminal case, 
arguing that because the initial wiretap application stated the predicate offense of wire fraud 
and he was never charged with wire fraud, the evidence derived from the wiretaps should not 
be admitted in a prosecution for securities fraud. Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *1.  
However, the court held that because “Title III authorizes the government to use wiretaps to 
investigate wire fraud, the government was authorized to use wiretaps to investigate a 
fraudulent insider trading scheme using interstate wires even though Title III does not 
specifically authorize wiretaps to investigate insider trading alone.” Id.  Thus, the 
government’s failure to charge the defendants with wire fraud does not necessarily preclude 
the use of the plain-view exception. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
 94. 18 U.S.C. § 2518; see also Mike Lewis, Electronic Surveillance, 77 GEO. L.J. 594, 
598–611 (1988). 
 95. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). 
 96. Id. § 2518(3). 
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Upon expiration of a wiretap order, the intercepted recordings must be 
made available to the judge who issued the order and filed under seal,97 
though the government is permitted to maintain duplicate recordings of the 
wiretaps for use or disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 
§ 2517(1)–(2).98  The section also requires that applications for and orders 
granting the government authority to conduct wiretaps be sealed by the 
judge and that they “shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause 
before a judge of competent jurisdiction.”99 
b.  Disclosures Expressly Prohibited—§ 2511 
Section 2511 explicitly prohibits the disclosure or use of wiretaps in two 
instances:  (1) with the knowledge that said wiretaps were obtained 
unlawfully,100 and (2) for the purpose of impeding a criminal investigation, 
with knowledge that said wiretaps were intercepted in connection with a 
criminal investigation.101 
Notably, though the Senate Report accompanying Title III states that 
§ 2511 prohibits the disclosure of all intercepted communications except for 
those explicitly permitted,102 the language of § 2511 itself does not 
 
 97. Id. §§ 2518(5), (8)(a); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 
27 (2005), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-sur-
manual.pdf [hereinafter DOJ MANUAL] (“The purpose of the sealing requirement is to 
preserve the integrity of the electronic surveillance evidence.”) [http://perma.cc/CW3V-
2JPS]. 
 98. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a); see id. § 2517(1)–(2); infra notes 106–13 and accompanying 
text. 
 99. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b).  The DOJ has taken the position that the legislative history 
of this subsection implies that the subsection also governs the disclosure of wiretap materials 
themselves, not just the applications and orders. See DOJ MANUAL, supra note 97 
(“Although section 2518(8)(b) provides for the disclosure of Title III ‘applications and 
orders,’ the legislative history reflects that it was also intended to apply to the disclosure of 
the Title III recordings themselves, as well as any related documentation.”).  The DOJ 
recommends that “when in doubt about whether the disclosure or use of electronic 
surveillance evidence is permitted, [attorneys should] obtain a court order pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) authorizing the disclosure and use for ‘good cause.’” Id.  However, this 
seems to overlook the fact that some courts have defined “good cause” similar to “aggrieved 
person,” and thus it is unlikely that the government will succeed. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11) 
(defining “aggrieved person” as “a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic 
communication or a person against whom the interception was directed”); In re New York 
Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401, 408 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)–(d); see also United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1232 
(7th Cir. 1982) (“Title III makes it a crime to disclose wiretap evidence (transcripts, logs, 
summaries, etc.) only if the evidence was obtained in violation of Title III and the disclosure 
is willful.”). 
 101. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(e).  The statute does not specifically say who would be doing 
the disclosing, but presumably addresses disclosure or use by anyone in lawful possession of 
the wiretap materials. See id. 
 102. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 91 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2180 
(“Section 2511 of the new chapter prohibits, except as otherwise specifically provided in the 
chapter itself, the interception and disclosure of all wire or oral communications.”). 
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explicitly say this.103  This inconsistency has led circuit courts to interpret 
Title III differently.104 
c.  Disclosures Expressly Permitted—§ 2517 
But § 2511 is not the only section of Title III causing trouble among 
circuit courts.  Section 2517, which outlines specific instances in which the 
disclosure of wiretaps or evidence derived therefrom is expressly permitted, 
also feeds into the question of whether the DOJ can disclose the fruits of 
wiretaps to civil enforcement agencies.105 
First, investigative or law enforcement officers106 are permitted to 
disclose the contents of wiretaps, or evidence derived therefrom, to another 
investigative or law enforcement officer “to the extent that such disclosure 
is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer 
making or receiving the disclosure.”107  This will be referred to as the “law 
enforcement disclosure” provision.  Disclosures under this provision may 
be made at any time and are not required to be postponed until after the 
surveillance is completed.108  The purpose of this provision is to facilitate 
the exchange of information among law enforcement personnel, particularly 
between state and federal officers.109 
Second, investigative or law enforcement officers may use the contents 
of wiretaps “to the extent such use is appropriate to the proper performance 
of [the investigative or law enforcement officer’s] official duties.”110  This 
will be referred to as the “law enforcement use” provision.  In framing this 
 
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511.  A canon of construction, “the title and heading canon,” 
provides that in certain circumstances, courts may use titles or headings as interpretive aids. 
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 367 
(2010).  Two states’ codified canons of construction lend support to giving a section header 
some weight when interpreting a statute; however, twenty-two states have codified an 
affirmative rejection of this canon. Id. at 368. 
 104. See infra Part II.A. 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 2517; see also Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1232 (“[B]y permitting disclosure 
of lawfully obtained wiretap evidence only under the specific circumstances listed in 18 
U.S.C. § 2517, Title III implies that what is not permitted is forbidden.”); infra Part II.A.  
The three discussed permitted disclosures under § 2517 appear to “assume that disclosure 
may be made without a determination as to the legality of the interception, except as to 
disclosure through testimony about offenses not listed in the order.” Atkins, supra note 22, at 
740. 
 106. An “investigative or law enforcement officer” is “any officer of the United States or 
of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct 
investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in this chapter[] and any 
attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(7). 
 107. Id. § 2517(1). 
 108. 2 HON. JAMES G. CARR & PATRICIA L. BELLIA, LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE 
§ 7:34 (2015). 
 109. Id. 
 110. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2); see Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 
1977) (“The disclosure by an investigative or law enforcement officer of the contents of an 
intercepted communication to IRS revenue agents may constitute ‘use’ of such contents that 
is ‘appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2517(2))); infra Part II.A. 
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section, the Senate had in mind that it would authorize uses such as 
establishing probable cause for arrest, establishing probable cause to search, 
or refreshing the recollection of witnesses.111  Additional lawful disclosures 
under § 2517(2) include the disclosure to third parties in order to have them 
identify speakers’ voices112 and to secretaries for administrative 
assistance.113 
Third, any person114 who has lawfully received any information from a 
wiretap may disclose that information “while giving testimony under oath 
or affirmation in any proceeding held under the authority of the United 
States or of any State or political subdivision thereof.”115  This will be 
referred to as the “testimonial disclosure” provision.  Prior to 1970,116 
however, § 2517(3) permitted testimonial disclosures “in any criminal 
proceeding.”117  However, pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, § 2517(3) was amended to remove the word 
“criminal,” thus potentially broadening the applicability of the provision to 
permit testimonial disclosures of wiretap materials in civil proceedings as 
well as criminal proceedings.118 
Section 2518(8)(b) addresses the disclosure of the applications made and 
orders granted under Title III.119  The DOJ, however, has suggested that 
this section should be interpreted as addressing requests for disclosures of 
wiretap materials themselves.120 
 
 111. S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2188. 
 112. United States v. Rabstein, 554 F.2d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. O’Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1417 (8th Cir. 1988); Rabstein, 
554 F.2d at 193; 2 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 108, § 7:36. 
 114. “Any person” is defined as “any employee, or agent of the United States or any State 
or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock 
company, trust, or corporation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6). Compare id., with supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3). 
 116. In 1970, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was 
enacted, which established a civil cause of action for activities undertaken by criminal 
organizations and amended 18 U.S.C. § 2517(3). Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 902(b), 84 Stat. 922, 947. 
 117. Id. at 944 (emphasis added). 
 118. See In re Motion to Unseal Elec. Surveillance Evidence, 965 F.2d 637, 639 (8th Cir. 
1992) (“The words ‘any proceeding’ [in § 2517(3)] are clearly sufficient to include private 
civil action such as the one in this case.”), rev’d en banc, 990 F.2d 1015, 1018–19 (8th Cir. 
1993) (rejecting the contention that the 1970 amendment’s removal of the word “criminal” 
from § 2517(3) permits pretrial disclosure of wiretap materials to a nongovernmental party); 
Jesse G. Kreier, Electronic Surveillance, 74 GEO. L.J. 559, 568 n.517 (1986) (suggesting that 
wiretaps may be used in civil proceedings to which the government is a party). But see Nat’l 
Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[T]urning Title 
III into a general civil discovery mechanism would simply ignore the privacy rights of those 
whose conversations are overheard.”). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b). 
 120. DOJ MANUAL, supra note 97, § 9-7.000. 
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d.  Use As Evidence and Grounds for Suppression 
Sections 2515 and 2518 address whether wiretap materials may be 
introduced into evidence, as well as the grounds for suppression.121  Section 
2515 prohibits the introduction into evidence of wiretaps or evidence 
derived therefrom “if the disclosure of [such materials] would be in 
violation of” the Wiretap Act.122  This subsection has been interpreted as 
prohibiting wiretap materials intercepted in violation of the Wiretap Act 
from being introduced into evidence, not wiretap materials that were 
disclosed in violation of the act.123  For example, wire communications 
obtained without a warrant would be prohibited from being introduced into 
evidence because they were intercepted in violation of the Wiretap Act; 
however, lawfully intercepted wire communications that have subsequently 
been disclosed to another party in violation of the act are not necessarily 
prohibited from being introduced into evidence.124 
Section 2518(10)(a) outlines the provisions regarding the suppression of 
wiretaps.125  It states, in relevant part: 
Any aggrieved person in any . . . proceeding in or before any 
court . . . may move to suppress the contents of any wire or oral 
communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter, or evidence derived 
therefrom, on the grounds that— 
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted; 
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted 
is insufficient on its face; or 
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of 
authorization or approval.126 
Notably absent from the list of grounds for suppression is an unlawful 
disclosure.127  Indeed, courts have interpreted this provision as providing a 
remedy of suppression for unlawfully intercepted communications, not for 
unlawfully disclosed communications.128 
 
 121. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518. 
 122. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. 
 123. See Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 124. See id. 
 125. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Resha v. United States, 767 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1985); Fleming, 547 F.2d at 
874; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for a Protective Order to 
Prohibit the Unlawful Disclosure of Wiretap Evidence, United States v. Rajaratnam, 2010 
WL 2131194 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (No. 09 Cr. 1184) [hereinafter Memorandum] 
(arguing that Fleming should not be interpreted as permitting disclosure of wiretaps to a civil 
enforcement agency, because it held only that such disclosed evidence could not be 
suppressed). 
1266 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
II.  DIFFERENT STROKES FOR DIFFERENT FOLKS:  
CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF TITLE III 
With an understanding of the statutory framework governing court-
authorized wiretaps, the tools of statutory construction, and the importance 
of resolving the circuit split, this part discusses the cases and arguments 
pertaining to whether the DOJ can share the fruits of wiretaps with the SEC 
in a parallel or joint investigation.  Part II.A begins with the descriptive 
question of statutory interpretation—that is, whether the Wiretap Act 
permits the DOJ to share the fruits of wiretaps with civil enforcement 
agencies.  It discusses the different constructions of the Wiretap Act and the 
cases that support such constructions.  Part II.B then addresses the 
normative question of whether the DOJ should be allowed to share the 
fruits of wiretaps with the SEC during a parallel or joint investigation in 
light of the privacy interests at stake. 
A.  The Descriptive Question:  
Three Views on Sharing Wiretaps with Civil Enforcement Agencies 
Though some courts have been presented with the opportunity to address 
the issue of direct disclosure of the fruits of wiretaps from the DOJ to a civil 
enforcement agency, they have declined to do so.129  Many courts have, 
however, addressed the limits of the disclosure provisions of the Wiretap 
Act and have come out in different ways.  It is these assessments of the 
disclosure provisions that may support or weaken the case for the direct 
disclosure of wiretaps from the DOJ to the SEC. 
1.  The Wiretap Act Explicitly Permits Such Disclosures 
Some have argued that the Wiretap Act expressly permits direct 
disclosures of wiretap materials from the DOJ to the SEC under the law 
enforcement disclosure and law enforcement use provisions.130  However, 
the law enforcement disclosure provision requires both the disclosing party 
and the recipient to be “investigative or law enforcement officer[s].”131  
This is unlikely to happen, however, because only those officials who are 
authorized to investigate or prosecute predicate offenses qualify as an 
investigative or law enforcement officer, and securities fraud is not a 
predicate offense.132  However, the SEC could argue that because it often 
investigates wire fraud as part of its investigations into insider trading and 
 
 129. See, e.g., SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 174 (2d Cir. 2010) (declining to confirm 
whether the USAO’s position that it is permitted to disclose wiretap materials directly to the 
SEC is correct); Resha, 767 F.2d at 287–88 (finding it unnecessary to decide whether the 
disclosure of wiretap materials from the DOJ to the IRS was permissible, because even if it 
were unlawful, unlawful disclosure is not grounds for suppression). 
 130. Atkins, supra note 22, at 737; DOJ MANUAL, supra note 97 (noting that the 
legislative history and case law indicate that “disclosure of Title III information for any 
legitimate investigative purpose associated with the development of a criminal case” is 
permitted under § 2517); see supra Part I.C.2.b. 
 131. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 132. Atkins, supra note 22, at 737–38. 
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shares that information with the DOJ, such SEC officials qualify as law 
enforcement or investigative officers under § 2517(1).133  Additionally, the 
SEC could argue that by participating in a formal joint task force such as 
the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force,134 its agents qualify as a law 
enforcement or investigative officer because of their direct involvement in 
the government’s criminal investigations into wire fraud, which is a 
predicate offense.135 
Disclosures under § 2517(2) may be more likely to withstand scrutiny, 
because this subsection does not limit disclosures to investigative or law 
enforcement officers.136  Indeed, the Fifth Circuit has suggested that 
“disclosure by an investigative or law enforcement officer of [wiretap 
materials] to IRS revenue agents may constitute ‘use’ of such contents that 
is ‘appropriate to the proper performance of his official duties’”137 in 
accordance with the permitted disclosures under § 2517(2).138 
In Fleming v. United States,139 the court addressed the question of 
whether lawfully intercepted wiretap materials that were disclosed from the 
DOJ to IRS revenue agents could be introduced into evidence in a 
subsequent civil case.140  The petitioner argued that Title III prohibited the 
wiretaps from being admitted into evidence in the civil case because § 2515 
mandates the exclusion of evidence that has been improperly disclosed, and 
§ 2517 is the sole authority for permitted disclosures.141  Therefore, the 
petitioner argued, because § 2517 does not expressly permit disclosure from 
the FBI to the civil tax authorities, the disclosure was unlawful and thus 
should not have been admitted into evidence in accordance with § 2515.142 
 
 133. Id. 
 134. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 135. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 136. See Atkins, supra note 22, at 738; supra Part I.C.2.c (discussing expressly permitted 
disclosures). 
 137. Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2517(2)(2012)); see also Griffin v. United States, 588 F.2d 521, 526 
(5th Cir. 1979) (refusing to overrule the holding in Fleming).  Both Griffin and Fleming 
stemmed from the same incident, but the cases involved different claims against the IRS; the 
IRS counterclaimed in each case and relied on the wiretaps from the criminal investigation 
as part of its counterclaims. Griffin, 588 F.2d at 521–22; Fleming, 547 F.2d at 873. 
 138. IRS revenue agents are responsible for auditing tax returns; IRS special agents are 
responsible for the criminal investigation of tax offenses. See Caroline D. Ciraolo, Criminal 
Tax Cases:  A Primer, in STRATEGIES FOR CRIMINAL TAX CASES:  LEADING LAWYERS ON 
NAVIGATING TAX LAW, UNDERSTANDING DISCLOSURE GUIDELINES, AND RESPONDING TO 
GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS 75, 80–82 (Aspatore 2011). 
 139. 547 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 140. Id. at 873.  The defense conceded that the interception of the wiretaps conducted by 
the FBI comported with all statutory requirements. Id. 
 141. See id. at 873; see also supra Part I.C.2.c. 
 142. The court’s opinion did not discuss the government’s opposing arguments, if any. 
Fleming, 547 F.2d at 873 (“[T]he government agents were not free to disclose the 
information they had obtained to IRS revenue agents.”).  The petitioner further argued that 
Title III does not permit the use of wiretaps to investigate civil tax offenses. Id. 
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Though the court ultimately resolved the question of admissibility based 
on other grounds,143 it proceeded to hypothetically analyze the question of 
whether the materials were lawfully disclosed.144  The court found that, 
even if the Wiretap Act prohibited the introduction of evidence that was 
unlawfully disclosed (as opposed to unlawfully intercepted), “[t]he 
disclosure by an investigative or law enforcement officer of the contents of 
an intercepted communication to IRS revenue agents may constitute ‘use’ 
of such contents that is ‘appropriate to the proper performance of his 
official duties’” under the law enforcement use145 provision.146  The court 
additionally found that, given that the disclosure of wiretap materials when 
testifying in court is permitted pursuant to the testimonial disclosure147 
provision, it would be reasonable to permit disclosure of the contents of 
testimony to the IRS revenue agents in preparation for the trial.148 
To fit direct disclosure into the reach of § 2517(2), the SEC and similar 
civil enforcement agencies could “condition aid in USAO criminal 
investigations on forthright cooperation by the USAO, including disclosure 
of wiretap recordings.”149  By doing so, disclosure or use of the wiretaps in 
this manner would be made in furtherance of the USAO’s official duties of 
criminal investigation and prosecution.150 
2.  Expressio Unius Prohibits Such Disclosure 
When presented with questions regarding disclosures of wiretaps, some 
circuits have applied expressio unius to interpret Title III as prohibiting all 
 
 143. The court permitted the introduction of the wiretaps into evidence based on its 
interpretation of § 2515—that § 2515 prohibited unlawfully intercepted wiretap materials 
from being introduced into evidence, not unlawfully disclosed wiretap materials. Id. at 874. 
 144. Id. 
 145. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text. 
 146. Fleming, 547 F.2d at 874 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (2012)). 
 147. See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 148. Fleming, 547 F.2d at 875. 
 149. Atkins, supra note 22, at 745. 
 150. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 2517(1)–(2); DOJ MANUAL, supra note 97, at 33 (“[I]t is clear 
from the legislative history and the case law . . . that section 2517 allows the disclosure of 
Title III information for any legitimate investigative purpose associated with the 
development of a criminal case . . . .”). 
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disclosures except those expressly permitted by § 2517.151  Many 
academics and professionals construe the disclosure provisions similarly.152 
The Seventh Circuit is one circuit that has followed this approach.153  In 
United States v. Dorfman,154 news media (who were not parties to the case) 
submitted a motion to the district court to unseal sealed exhibits in an 
ongoing criminal proceeding that contained wiretap materials, so that the 
media could inspect and copy them.155  The district judge ruled that most of 
the sealed exhibits could be unsealed, though the unsealing of some would 
have to wait until the jury was empaneled.156  The defendants to the 
criminal case, whose conversations were intercepted by the wiretaps, 
appealed the district court’s order to the Seventh Circuit on the basis that 
the unsealing of the exhibits before they were admitted into evidence at 
trial157 would violate Title III and the defendants’ constitutional right to a 
fair trial.158 
In ruling on the appeal, the Seventh Circuit made clear that it was 
adopting an expressio unius approach to interpret the disclosure provisions 
 
 151. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1078 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The statutory 
structure makes it clear that any interceptions of communications and invasions of individual 
privacy are prohibited unless expressly authorized in Title III.”); In re Motion to Unseal 
Elec. Surveillance Evidence, 990 F.2d 1015, 1018 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (rehearing en 
banc overruling the 8th Circuit’s prior decision that previously undisclosed wiretap evidence 
could be made available to private civil RICO litigants in some situations and stating that 
“[w]hen addressing disclosure of the contents of a wiretap, the question is whether Title III 
specifically authorizes such disclosure, not whether Title III specifically prohibits the 
disclosure, for Title III prohibits all disclosures not authorized therein”); United States v. 
Underhill, 813 F.2d 105, 107 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Unless there is a specific section of the statute 
which excepts a particular interception, all willful interceptions of wire and oral 
communications are prohibited by the [Wiretap] Act.”); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 
1230, 1232–33 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 152. See 2 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 108, § 7:51; Title III Electronic Surveillance 
Material and the Intelligence Community, 24 Op. O.L.C. 261, 263 (2000), http://www. 
justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-v024-p0261.pdf [hereinafter 
OLC Opinion] [http://perma.cc/4RWN-FHCQ]. 
 153. See Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1231.  It is noteworthy, however, that the party requesting 
access was neither a civil enforcement agency nor a party to the case. See id. 
 154. 690 F.2d 1230 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 155. Id.  The government had engaged in comprehensive wiretapping of suspects in a 
scheme to defraud a union’s pension fund, and as a result of evidence obtained through these 
wiretaps, five defendants were ultimately charged with various federal criminal offenses, 
including bribery of a U.S. Senator. Id.  The defendants in the case included “senior officers 
of labor unions and alleged captains of ‘organized crime.’” Id.  The defendants in the 
criminal case challenged the legality of the government’s use of wiretaps to investigate the 
crimes allegedly committed by the defendants and moved to suppress such evidence in 
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). Id.  During an evidentiary hearing on the 
defendants’ motion, the government submitted approximately 200 exhibits containing 
wiretap materials. Id.  The district court ultimately found that the government’s use of 
wiretaps to investigate certain crimes was lawful, and the judge ordered the exhibits to be 
sealed. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. In a parenthetical insertion, the Seventh Circuit noted that most of the wiretap 
exhibits would not be put into evidence at trial. Id. 
 158. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI; supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing the procedures 
regarding sealing wiretaps and related materials). 
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of Title III.159  The court reasoned that by criminalizing the disclosure of 
wiretaps in the specific instances outlined in § 2511, yet also expressly 
permitting certain disclosures in § 2517, “Title III implies that what is not 
permitted is forbidden . . . though not necessarily under pain of criminal 
punishment.”160  The court also looked to the legislative history of Title III, 
namely the “emphasis the draftsmen put on the importance of protecting 
privacy to the extent compatible with the law enforcement objectives of 
Title III,” and found that given the legislative interest in protecting privacy, 
Title III should be construed narrowly.161 
Judge James G. Carr and Professor Patricia L. Bellia adopted the use of 
expressio unius to interpret the disclosure provisions of Title III in their 
treatise on the law of electronic surveillance.162  They state, “A prosecutor 
has no discretion to disregard the restrictions in these provisions or to 
request or obtain authorization for release that is not within the statutory 
limitations.”163  However, “[o]nce public disclosure has occurred at a trial, 
disclosure can be made in other proceedings without regard to the strictures 
of § 2517.”164  This is because any privacy interests at stake pretrial are 
eliminated when the information is made public via disclosure during trial, 
which is generally open to the public. 
The DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC)—the office responsible for 
providing legal advice to the executive branch of the government—
similarly adopted the expressio unius approach in a published opinion letter 
providing guidance on the interpretation of Title III’s disclosure 
provisions.165  In this letter, the OLC stated that “Title III prohibits every 
disclosure that it does not explicitly authorize.”166  Likewise, the Criminal 
Resource Manual published by the DOJ provides that Assistant United 
States Attorneys should use wiretap materials in accordance with the 
disclosure requirements of § 2517, including “obtaining all appropriate 
court orders[] and advising the court of the full scope of the proposed 
disclosure.”167 
Thus, when determining whether direct disclosures of wiretap materials 
from the DOJ to the SEC are permitted, a court may construe Title III in 
accordance with expressio unius, as did the Seventh Circuit in Dorfman and 
 
 159. Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1232; see also supra Part I.A. 
 160. Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1232. 
 161. Id. (citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 47–51 (1972)); see S. REP. NO. 90-
1097, at 66–67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153–54. 
 162. 2 CARR & BELLIA, supra note 108, § 7:51. 
 163. Id. § 7:33. 
 164. Id. 
 165. OLC Opinion, supra note 152. 
 166. Id. at 272. 
 167. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL:  CRIMINAL RESOURCE 
MANUAL § 34, http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm00034. 
htm#34 [http://perma.cc/63B2-T5B9].  Recently, however, the DOJ has appeared to 
recognize the increased debate over Title III’s interpretation, as in its Electronic Surveillance 
Manual, the DOJ notes that “the release of [wiretap materials] for [purposes other than the 
development of a criminal case] is the subject of dispute.” DOJ MANUAL, supra note 97. 
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the OLC in its opinion letter.168  In such a case, direct disclosure of wiretaps 
from the DOJ to the SEC would only be permitted if it qualified under the 
law enforcement disclosure or law enforcement use provisions of § 2517.169 
3.  The Adoption of a Balancing Test 
Though the particular question of direct disclosure from the USAO to 
civil enforcement agencies like the SEC has not been resolved by any court, 
the Second Circuit has, on numerous occasions, addressed the disclosure 
provisions with respect to third-party access to wiretapped conversations or 
their related documents.170  In addressing these cases, the Second Circuit 
has consistently rejected the application of expressio unius to the disclosure 
provisions of Title III and has instead held that a failure to explicitly permit 
something does not necessarily mean that the obverse is true.171  Indeed, in 
In re Application of Newsday, Inc.,172 the Second Circuit adopted a two-part 
balancing test to determine whether disclosure of wiretap materials may be 
disclosed to a particular third party.173 
The balancing test first requires the court to consider whether the 
requesting party would generally have a right of access to the materials, 
notwithstanding the fact that they may contain wiretaps (or evidence 
derived therefrom) lawfully obtained pursuant to Title III.174  The Supreme 
Court has recognized a general common law “right to inspect and copy 
public records and documents, including judicial records and 
documents,”175 and also recognized that search warrants and affidavits 
submitted in their support qualify as public documents that are required to 
be filed with the clerk of the issuing court under Rule 41 of the Federal 
 
 168. See United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1232 (7th Cir. 1982); see also supra 
notes 162–67 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1232; see also supra Part II.A.1. 
 170. See, e.g., In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74, 76 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting 
that Title III does not “address the issue of public access to intercepted communications 
when those communications become part of a public document after having been used by the 
government in the course of its law enforcement activities”); Nat’l Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 735 F.2d 51, 53–55 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the testimonial disclosure 
provision does not turn “Title III into a general civil discovery mechanism”). 
 171. See, e.g., SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 173 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]e reiterate 
today that Title III does not prohibit whatever disclosures of lawfully seized communications 
it does not expressly permit.”); Newsday, 895 F.2d at 77 (rejecting the contention that 
§ 2517’s failure to create a right of public access evidences Congress’s intent “to forbid 
public access by any other means on any other occasion”). Contra Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 
1232 (“Title III implies that what is not permitted is forbidden.”).  Rejecting expressio unius 
thus shifts the analysis from whether Title III expressly permits a disclosure, to whether Title 
III expressly prohibits a disclosure. See Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 180 (finding that because 
the appellants “failed to point [the court] to any case law establishing that Title III prohibits 
the disclosure of wiretap materials in a situation such as this one,” the court should proceed 
with the Newsday balancing test). 
 172. 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 173. See id. at 79.  Though not a direct party to the case, the government took “the 
position that Title III does not forbid disclosure and that the district court’s order should be 
affirmed.” Id. at 76. 
 174. Id. at 79. 
 175. Id. at 78 (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978)). 
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Rules of Criminal Procedure.176  The Second Circuit further stated, “The 
presence of material derived from intercepted communications in the 
warrant application [did] not change its status as a public document subject 
to a common law right of access,” though its presence may require close 
review by the judge before the materials are unsealed.177  The court held 
that “there is a common law right to inspect what is commanded thus to be 
filed” where “the warrant has been executed, a plea-bargain agreement has 
been reached, the government admits that its need for secrecy is over, and 
the time has arrived for filing the application with the clerk.”178 
The second part of the test requires the court to balance the right of 
access identified in part one of the test against the privacy interests of the 
parties whose communications were intercepted, because “the common law 
right of access is qualified by recognition of the privacy rights of the 
persons whose intimate relations may thereby be disclosed.”179  In 
conducting this balancing, courts should consider “whose privacy interests 
might be infringed, how they would be infringed, what portions of the tapes 
might infringe them, and what portion of the evidence consisted of the 
tapes.”180  Additionally, courts should give extra weight to the privacy 
interests of innocent third parties that may be implicated or harmed by 
disclosure.181  In Newsday, the Second Circuit found that the district court 
satisfactorily balanced the privacy interests, given the legitimate public 
interest in the case, the defendants’ guilty pleas, the “mundane business 
nature” of the wiretaps, and the redactions made to protect the identities of 
innocent third parties.182  The Second Circuit was also satisfied that the 
defendant in the criminal case was provided with a copy of the intercepted 
communications and found that the defendant had sufficient time to develop 
objections to the disclosure.183  As such, the materials could be disclosed 
without harming any privacy interests. 
 
 176. Id. at 77; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d)(2)(C) (“Testimony taken in support of a warrant 
must be recorded by a court reporter or by a suitable recording device, and the judge must 
file the transcript or recording with the clerk, along with any affidavit.”); see also Newsday, 
895 F.2d at 77–79 (comparing the materials sought in the present case to those sought in 
Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1231—sealed exhibits containing wiretap materials which are not 
public documents required to be filed in the court’s records—and Times Mirror Co. v. 
United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th Cir. 1989)—grand jury records, to which no general 
right of access have ever been recognized). 
 177. Newsday, 895 F.2d at 79.  The court did not address the argument that the press has a 
constitutional right of access to documents contained in search warrant applications, because 
the canon of constitutional avoidance requires that courts avoid deciding constitutional 
issues if judgments can be rendered on some other basis. Id. at 75, 78. 
 178. Id. at 79. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. (quoting In re New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 76, 80. 
 183. Id. at 80. 
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In 2009, the SEC brought a civil action against Raj Rajaratnam,184 the 
CEO of Galleon Group whose criminal prosecution marked the first time 
that wiretaps were used to prosecute securities fraud.185  As part of its 
criminal investigation, the DOJ conducted court-authorized wiretaps of 
phone calls between the various defendants and other parties, the fruits of 
which were subsequently provided to the defense as part of criminal 
discovery.186  After the criminal suit was brought, but before any ruling was 
made on the legality of the wiretaps, the SEC sought access to the wiretap 
recordings from the defense as part of discovery in its civil case.187  The 
district court approved the request and ordered the defense to produce the 
materials to the SEC under a protective order that “prohibit[ed] the 
disclosure of the wiretap recordings to any non-party until, at a minimum, a 
court of competent jurisdiction had ruled on the [defendants’] suppression 
motion.”188  The defense appealed.189 
On appeal, the Second Circuit reiterated Newsday’s rejection of expressio 
unius as a means of interpreting the disclosure provisions of Title III.190  
The court likened the present case to Newsday because the SEC requested 
disclosure of Title III materials “incident to, or after,” their use under 
§ 2517, which Newsday recognized as not addressed by Title III and thus 
not necessarily prohibited.191  The Second Circuit then proceeded to 
conduct the Newsday two-part balancing test.192 
First, the court found that the SEC had an independent right of access to 
the wiretap materials in the defendants’ possession “based on the civil 
discovery principle of equal information.”193  The court found that failure to 
permit the SEC to obtain materials in the possession of the defendants 
would create an “informational imbalance” between the civil litigants, 
because the defendants would have the benefit of knowing the contents of 
the wiretaps while the SEC would not.194  The court found that this 
“informational imbalance” prejudiced the SEC’s preparation for the civil 
trial and thus “clearly” established the SEC’s interest in accessing the 
materials.195 
 
 184. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam 
with Insider Trading (Oct. 16, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm 
[http://perma.cc/5H8D-X4C5]. 
 185. SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 186. Id. at 165. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 166. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 176–77. 
 191. Id. at 177 (quoting In re Application of Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 192. See id. at 177–78; see also supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text (discussing 
Newsday’s two-part balancing test). 
 193. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 180 (“Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered 
by both parties is essential to proper litigation.” (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle 
Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 540 n.25 (1987))). 
 194. Id. at 175. 
 195. Id. at 184. 
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However, the Second Circuit found that the district court did not properly 
balance the SEC’s right to the materials against the relevant privacy 
interests at stake, because the legality of the wiretaps in the criminal case 
had not been determined.196  The Second Circuit found that even though 
Title III does not address disclosures of intercepted calls by defendants to 
other parties, “[i]t absolutely prohibits . . . the intentional disclosure of the 
fruits of unlawful wiretapping.”197  Thus, if the criminal court were to 
subsequently determine that the wiretaps were obtained unlawfully, the 
second prong of the Newsday test would be drastically affected because the 
privacy rights of the individuals involved would have already been found to 
be “grievously infringed, and further dissemination of conversations that 
had been illegally intercepted would only compound the injury.”198  The 
court thus concluded that “[t]he privacy interests at stake prior to a ruling 
on the legality of interceptions clearly outweigh the SEC’s interest in 
discovery.”199  The Second Circuit also found that the privacy interests of 
innocent third parties whose communications were intercepted must be 
addressed before a ruling on disclosure could be made.200  Because the 
district court failed to limit the disclosure of the wiretaps to relevant 
conversations, it erroneously balanced the privacy interests at stake.201 
B.  The Normative Question:  
Should the DOJ Share Wiretap Materials with the SEC? 
The legislature was aware that creating a framework for government-
authorized wiretaps could potentially have serious implications for an 
individual’s privacy interests.202  Thus, when evaluating the scope of Title 
III, it is important not to lose sight of the first of the dual purposes of its 
enactment:  the protection of individuals’ privacy rights.203  Part II.B begins 
with a discussion of the benefits of allowing the DOJ to directly disclose the 
fruits of wiretaps with the SEC.  It then discusses the policy issues 
regarding whether the DOJ should be able to directly disclose the fruits of 
wiretaps with the SEC in light of the privacy interests at stake at various 
points throughout the course of an investigation. 
 
 196. Id. at 167–68. 
 197. Id. at 185. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 187.  It has been suggested that it may be unnecessary to wait until the criminal 
court has ruled on the legality of the interception of the wiretaps, as long as the civil judge in 
the case makes the determination herself. Atkins, supra note 22, at 745. 
 200. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 187. 
 201. Id. 
 202. See S. REP. NO. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2153. 
 203. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing the legislative history and dual-purpose of Title III). 
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1.  Benefits of Comprehensive Information Sharing 
Between the DOJ and the SEC 
Courts recognize the efficiency of parallel investigations, especially with 
respect to requests for information.204  Mary Jo White, current Chairwoman 
of the SEC, has noted that “the SEC’s expertise and extensive cooperation 
and partnership with the criminal authorities is essential to all-
encompassing enforcement of the federal securities laws.”205  She argues 
that a “robust combination of criminal and regulatory enforcement of the 
securities laws is not only appropriate, but also critical to deterring 
securities violators, punishing misconduct, and protecting investors.”206 
But as previously discussed, the strategies used by conspirators of insider 
trading have increasingly made the crime more difficult to investigate using 
traditional methods of investigation.207  For example, the SEC had initially 
been unable to establish a sufficient case in SEC v. Rajaratnam208 through 
traditional methods of investigation and thus referred the case to the 
criminal authorities who could investigate the case using more aggressive 
techniques.209 
As the agencies work so closely together—often conducting joint 
interviews and depositions and sharing notes and strategies—“[i]t is 
certainly anomalous that the SEC can’t get the [wiretap materials] from the 
Department of Justice, its ally.”210  Professor Dan Richman has said, “It 
would be extremely odd [to] have an adjudication of the civil case without 
evidence that could emerge in a subsequent criminal case.”211 
2.  Concerns Regarding Increased Sharing Among Agencies 
One of the cases leading up to the enactment of Title III emphasized the 
seriousness of the implications that wiretaps have on individuals’ privacy 
interests:  “Few threats to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by 
the use of eavesdropping devices.”212  When personal communications are 
intercepted via wiretaps, privacy interests of innocent third parties are often 
 
 204. See Panel I, supra note 57 (discussing the reasoning behind the legality of parallel 
investigations). 
 205. White, supra note 15. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See Herzinger & Mermelstein, supra note 59, at 32. 
 208. 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 209. See Herzinger & Mermelstein, supra note 59, at 32 (“With traditional tactics, he 
escaped prosecution.  With wiretaps, he was convicted, fined $10 million, ordered to forfeit 
$53.8 million, and sentenced to 11 years in federal prison.  Rajaratnam was also ordered to 
pay a $92.8 million civil penalty to the SEC, the largest ever in an insider trading case.”). 
But see Panel II, supra note 60 (suggesting that the criminal case against Rajaratnam might 
have been successful even without the wiretapped conversations). 
 210. Jonathan Stempel, ANALYSIS—Galleon Wiretaps Big for White-Collar Crime Cases, 
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2010, 9:12 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/01/27/idINIndia-45739 
920100127 [http://perma.cc/3MR5-MK8K]. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 63 (1967). 
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implicated.213  Every year, the personal communications of hundreds of 
thousands of people are intercepted by the government, and approximately 
80 percent are deemed “not incriminating.”214  Phone lines authorized for 
interception by the government may be used for lawful, intimate 
conversations with loved ones, or calls involving other deeply personal 
information.  This section first discusses the varying levels of privacy 
interests at stake at different stages of investigations and then turns to the 
tools available to courts to protect privacy. 
a.  The Varying Privacy Implications 
over the Course of an Investigation 
In Bartnicki v. Vopper,215 the Supreme Court stated, “[T]he disclosure of 
the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on 
privacy than the interception itself.”216  Similarly, the Second Circuit has 
found that once the wiretaps have been disclosed and listened to by another 
party, the privacy rights of the parties to the recorded conversations “will 
forever have been harmed by the very act of exposure.”217  Essentially, 
once a disclosure has been made and the privacy rights have been violated, 
there is no going back.218  However, the privacy interests implicated by 
disclosure of wiretaps vary depending on the stage of the criminal 
investigation or prosecution.219  For example, once wiretap materials have 
been made public in court, any remaining privacy interests in such materials 
are weak because information that is public is no longer private.220  Indeed, 
in Fleming, the Fifth Circuit found that privacy interests were weak because 
the intercepted communications had already been introduced in open court 
during prior criminal proceedings.221  Additionally, in Newsday, the Second 
Circuit found that where the “warrant [had] been executed, a plea-bargain 
 
 213. See generally Brief for Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Appellants at 9, SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (Nos. 
10-462-cv(L), 10-464-cv(CON)), 2010 WL 2584231 [hereinafter EPIC Brief]. 
 214. Id. at 6–8. 
 215. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 216. Id. at 533. 
 217. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 170; see Mark B. Sheppard & Erin C. Dougherty, 
“Tapping” into Wall Street, 26 CRIM. JUST. 20, 22 (2012). 
 218. See Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d at 170. 
 219. See, e.g., id. at 171 (discussing the issues regarding timing of the parallel 
proceedings, including the fact that the legality of the wiretaps was not yet adjudicated in the 
criminal case parallel to the SEC proceeding); In re Application of Newsday, 895 F.2d 74, 
78 (2d Cir. 1990) (discussing cases in the Ninth, Eighth, and Fourth Circuits addressing 
varying rights of access to materials at differing stages of an investigation or prosecution). 
 220. See Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 874 (5th Cir. 1977); supra note 164 and 
accompanying text. 
 221. Fleming, 547 F.2d at 874.  In Griffin v. United States, the petitioners argued that they 
retained a privacy interest in the wiretap materials disclosed to the IRS prior to the admission 
of wiretap evidence in the criminal trial, but the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument. 588 F.2d 
521, 525 (5th Cir. 1979).  Instead, the court found that because the underlying facts of the 
case were identical to those in Fleming, “[t]he privacy interests implicated in Fleming and 
those in the present case do not differ in any significant respect,” and the statute must thus be 
construed as it was in Fleming. Id. 
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agreement [had] been reached, the government admit[ted] that its need for 
secrecy is over, and the time [had] arrived for filing the application with the 
clerk,” the privacy interests at stake in a search warrant affidavit containing 
evidence derived from wiretap materials no longer weighed in favor of 
nondisclosure.222 
However, in cases at the opposite end of the spectrum—where not only 
have the wiretap materials not been introduced into evidence, but the 
government has not even indicted targeted individuals—the privacy 
interests of the individuals’ conversations are likely to be very strong.223  
Times Mirror Co. v. United States224 found that the privacy interests of 
individuals named in the materials sought—warrants and their supporting 
affidavits—would be seriously compromised “if the public had access to 
warrant materials before indictments [were] returned.”225  The court 
expressed concern that disclosing the identities of investigative targets 
before an indictment has been returned would suggest to the public that 
such individuals may be guilty of a crime; but until such individuals are 
actually indicted, they would lack access to the appropriate forum to 
challenge such accusations.226 
Similarly, disclosures of wiretap materials prior to their lawful 
introduction during a public proceeding may have serious privacy 
implications in the event that the wiretaps are subsequently found to have 
been intercepted unlawfully.227  This issue arose in the Rajaratnam cases.  
In the criminal case, Rajaratnam and his codefendant sought to suppress the 
wiretaps and evidence derived therefrom on the basis that they were 
unlawfully intercepted.228  However, before any ruling was made on the 
legality of the interceptions, the SEC sought access to the wiretaps from the 
defendants as part of discovery in the SEC’s civil case.229  In addition to 
objecting to the SEC’s turnover request, the defense also motioned for the 
court hearing the criminal case to issue a protective order to prevent the 
USAO from sharing the fruits of wiretaps with the SEC.230  The defense 
argued that disclosure of the wiretaps before the court ruled on their legality 
would “irreparably compromis[e] their personal privacy rights, their 
statutorily protected privacy rights under Title III as ‘aggrieved persons,’ 
and their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments.”231  Like the targets of investigations in the pre-indictment 
stages, innocent third parties whose conversations have been intercepted as 
 
 222. Newsday, 895 F.2d at 79. 
 223. See id. (discussing Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 
1989)). 
 224. 873 F.2d 1210 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 225. Id. at 1218.  Note that the materials sought in Times Mirror Co. were not wiretap 
materials, but sealed affidavits in support of an application for a search warrant. Id. 
 226. Id. at 1216. 
 227. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 185–87 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 166–67; see also Memorandum, supra note 128, at 2. 
 230. See generally Memorandum, supra note 128. 
 231. Id. at 6. 
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part of the wiretaps of the targets also cannot meaningfully advocate for the 
preservation of their privacy, regardless of the stage of the investigation.232 
b.  Other Factors Weighing in the Balance 
The procedural requirements of Title III arguably help to assuage issues 
regarding privacy.233  When applying for authorization to conduct wiretaps, 
the government must explain whether traditional methods of investigation 
have been attempted, or why they likely would be unsuccessful.234  Patrick 
Carroll, an FBI Agent responsible for investigations into securities fraud 
and white collar crime, has acknowledged the “tremendous” intrusions into 
privacy posed by the use of wiretaps.235  As such, Agent Carroll has said 
that his team uses wiretapping “when [they] have exhausted all other 
techniques and . . . believe it is the right thing to do to disrupt and dismantle 
an organization.”236  The requirement for minimization of conversations 
irrelevant to the investigation also serves to protect the privacy interests of 
innocent third parties whose conversations are intercepted in the course of 
an investigation.237 
Additional tools are available to the courts to ensure that privacy interests 
are protected.238  Courts may grant protective orders to eliminate privacy 
concerns and prohibit further disclosure of wiretap materials to any 
additional parties—a precaution the Southern District of New York took 
when it first addressed the SEC’s request for the wiretap materials as part of 
civil discovery.239  As noted in an amicus brief in support of Rajaratnam’s 
appeal of the civil discovery order, “the principles of search minimization 
and relevance, as well as the Fourth Amendment, limit the state’s use of and 
access to these recordings.”240 
Furthermore, there is a key distinction between many of the cases that 
have addressed the interpretation of the disclosure provisions and the 
present question regarding direct disclosure:  the former cases often 
involved public disclosure of wiretap materials, whereas disclosure in the 
present hypothetical would be to a few professionally interested 
 
 232. See EPIC Brief, supra note 213, at 3–4. 
 233. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing the application and minimization requirements for 
wiretaps). 
 234. See supra Part I.C.2.a (discussing the application and minimization requirements for 
wiretaps). 
 235. Ailsa Chang, Wall Street Wiretaps:  Investigators Use Insiders’ Own Words to 
Convict Them, NPR (Dec. 26, 2012, 3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/26/168021457/ 
wall-street-wiretaps-investigators-use-insiders-own-words-to-convict-them [http://perma.cc/ 
5PBW-AWR6]. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
 238. See SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that the district 
court had entered a protective order prohibiting the disclosure of wiretap recordings to any 
nonparty). 
 239. See SEC v. Galleon Mgmt., 683 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), vacated, 
Rajaratnam, 622 F.3d 159 (granting the SEC’s motion for disclosure of the wiretap materials 
in part). 
 240. EPIC Brief, supra note 213, at 9. 
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government parties.241  Indeed, the court in Dorfman acknowledged that 
privacy interests are substantially implicated when wiretap materials are 
disclosed “to the world at large,” as opposed to when a handful of law 
enforcement officers and a district judge know the contents of wiretapped 
conversations.242 
III.  SHARING IS CARING, IT COULD BE FUN 
If there is one clear conclusion that comes out of the above cases, it is 
that there is serious disagreement about the proper way to interpret the 
disclosure provisions of Title III.243  But what principles can be gleaned 
from these cases and applied to the question of whether direct disclosure of 
wiretaps from the USAO to the SEC is permissible?  Part III.A argues that 
the proper way to interpret Title III is through an approach that incorporates 
aspects and principles of both the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Dorfman and 
the Second Circuit’s holdings in Rajaratnam and Newsday.  Part III.B then 
outlines a recommended procedure that Congress should enact to achieve 
the dual purposes of Title III. 
A.  A Blended Approach to Interpreting Title III 
First, it is clear that the disclosure of materials from the USAO to the 
SEC is neither explicitly prohibited nor explicitly permitted by Title III.244  
However, an analysis of the structure of Title III as a whole shows that such 
a blanket prohibition of disclosures does exist, though not necessarily under 
pain of criminal law.  Second, notwithstanding the fact that permitted 
disclosures are not required to be found within the boundaries of Title III, 
the SEC officers may have a strong case either to be considered “law 
enforcement officers” within the definition of the Wiretap Act, given the 
use of formal task forces targeting financial crime, or for the DOJ’s 
disclosure of wiretap materials to fall within the boundaries of a permitted 
disclosure under § 2517(2)’s law enforcement use provision. 
Section 2511—the provision outlining the expressly prohibited 
disclosures—does not explicitly prohibit all disclosures of wiretaps, though 
the legislative history indicates that perhaps it was intended to do so.245  
Rather, the specifically enumerated disclosures in § 2511 are those that are 
subject to criminal penalties of fines and/or imprisonment of up to five 
years.246  Furthermore, nowhere does Title III state that § 2511 outlines the 
 
 241. See, e.g., In re Application of Newsday, Inc., 895 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1990) (addressing 
disclosure to the news media); United States v. Dorfman, 690 F.2d 1230, 1234 (7th Cir. 
1982) (same). 
 242. Dorfman, 690 F.2d at 1234. 
 243. See supra Part II.A (outlining the conflicting interpretations of Title III’s disclosure 
provisions). 
 244. See supra Part I.C.2.b (discussing the explicitly prohibited disclosures); see also 
supra Part II.A.3. 
 245. See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
 246. See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
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only prohibited disclosures, nor that § 2517 outlines the only permitted 
disclosures.247 
In Dorfman, the Seventh Circuit held that § 2511 is not the sole source of 
prohibitions of interceptions and disclosures, but rather that the 
enumeration of certain permitted activities in § 2517 creates a negative 
implication that those disclosures that are not expressly permitted are thus 
prohibited.248  Though the court was correct in emphasizing that § 2511 is 
the sole source of Title III’s criminalizing authority, not the exclusive 
source of prohibited disclosures, its use of expressio unius to establish the 
universe of permitted interceptions and disclosures was incorrect.249  The 
structure and legislative history of Title III does not support the application 
of expressio unius, and thus the implication that additional restrictions stem 
from the enumeration of certain permitted disclosures in § 2517 is 
erroneous.250  As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has held that the 
expressio unius canon only applies if “it is fair to suppose that Congress 
considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.”251  This 
question can be addressed in two ways:  narrowly, by asking whether 
Congress considered the specific disclosure in question—from the USAO to 
the SEC—and meant to say no to it; or broadly, by asking whether 
Congress considered other types of disclosures—i.e., disclosures of wiretap 
materials as part of civil discovery or pursuant to a First Amendment right 
of access—and meant to say no to them.252  Given that Title III was enacted 
to assist in the investigation of organized crime, it is unlikely that in 1968 
Congress considered this particular type of disclosure from the USAO to 
the SEC.253 
When applying the canon of constitutional avoidance, however, it 
becomes easier to assume that Congress did not intend Title III to be 
construed using expressio unius.254  As the district court noted in Newsday, 
a strict expressio unius interpretation may have unconstitutional 
implications in the event that the media is found to have a First Amendment 
right to access wiretap materials.255  Thus, in accordance with the canon of 
 
 247. See supra Part I.C.2.b–c (discussing the expressly prohibited and expressly 
permitted disclosures). 
 248. See supra Part II.A.2 (suggesting that additional interceptions and disclosures may 
be forbidden, “though not necessarily under pain of criminal punishment”). 
 249. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 250. See supra Parts I.C.1, II.A.2. 
 251. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 252. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra Part I.C.1.  Though section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 
existed before the enactment of the Wiretap Act in 1968, insider trading did not achieve 
“wide-spread notoriety [until] the 1980s.” Thomas C. Newkirk, Assoc. Dir., SEC Div. of 
Enf’t, Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective:  Speech by SEC Staff at the 16th International 
Symposium on Economic Crime (Sept. 19, 1998), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm#FOOTNOTE_25 [http://perma.cc/9KSJ-XANR]. 
 254. See supra Part I.A (discussing the canons of construction). 
 255. See supra note 177 (noting that the district court held that the media may have a 
qualified constitutional right of access to the court documents).  The Second Circuit decided 
the case based on a potential common law right of access, in accordance with the canon of 
constitutional avoidance. See supra note 177. 
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constitutional avoidance, Title III should not be construed in a manner that 
would raise constitutional questions, and courts should reject expressio 
unius in favor of a more flexible approach, such as the Second Circuit’s 
two-part balancing test.256 
B.  A Balanced Proposal 
The per curiam opinion in Fleming accurately described Title III—that it 
“is not a model of clarity.”257  To address this lack of clarity and to ensure 
that both of the dual purposes of Title III are well supported, Congress 
should amend the Wiretap Act to create an explicit ex parte or in camera 
process through which the DOJ can request court approval to share the 
fruits of wiretaps with civil enforcement agencies. 
First, such a request for disclosure should come from the DOJ rather than 
the civil enforcement agency itself because the DOJ is in a better position to 
say whether the wiretaps contain useful information, being the party that 
presumably lawfully intercepted them.  The DOJ should be required to 
submit an application to the court similar to the application it submits when 
requesting the initial authorization to conduct wiretaps.258  In this 
application, the DOJ would need to identify the civil enforcement agency to 
which disclosure would be made, provide details regarding the particular 
regulatory violations believed to be evidenced by the wiretaps, describe the 
intercepted conversations that are believed to evidence such violations, and 
explain how such disclosure request came about (e.g., the SEC approached 
the DOJ after the SEC read an unsealed indictment suggesting that wiretaps 
were used to uncover evidence of securities fraud; the DOJ came across 
evidence of substantial regulatory violations and, on its own volition, would 
like to assist the SEC with an enforcement action).  The purpose of this last 
requirement is to assist the court in determining whether the DOJ’s wiretaps 
were merely a subterfuge for the civil enforcement action. 
Disclosures should be limited in scope to conversations relevant to any 
potential agency investigation.  Additionally, Congress may want to 
consider prohibiting the DOJ from disclosing actual copies of the wiretaps 
and instead limit permissible disclosure to transcripts of the relevant 
recordings or additional evidence derived therefrom.  Furthermore, all 
disclosures should be made under a protective order that limits the receiving 
agency’s ability to use or disclose the wiretap materials. 
The disclosure framework should also include a recordkeeping 
component to keep track of all evidence that the agency derives from the 
wiretap materials.  Then, if a court later finds that the wiretaps were 
unlawfully intercepted, this recordkeeping component would enable the 
SEC to easily identify what evidence may have been derived from unlawful 
wiretaps and would thus likely be inadmissible. 
 
 256. See supra notes 174–83 and accompanying text. 
 257. Fleming v. United States, 547 F.2d 872, 873 (5th Cir. 1977). 
 258. See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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Defendants and other aggrieved parties should be afforded the same 
rights to suppress such evidence if it is ever introduced during a court 
proceeding. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the increase of insider-trading prosecutions, the recognition of 
wiretaps as useful tools in investigating insider trading, and the increase in 
parallel investigations to combat such crimes, the unanswered question of 
whether the DOJ can share the fruits of wiretaps with the SEC is sure to 
arise again.  The circuit courts employing expressio unius have applied the 
tool incorrectly, because it is not necessarily “fair to suppose that Congress 
considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.”259  The 
balancing test adopted by other circuits balances the dual purposes of the 
Wiretap Act in a more efficient way, by ensuring that both the law 
enforcement and privacy protection objectives are fulfilled.  Still, the 
uncertainty of the most appropriate interpretation lingers, and it will do so 
until either the Supreme Court or Congress does something about it. 
Efficiency in investigation and prosecution calls for the DOJ to be able to 
share the fruits of wiretaps with their civil enforcement counterparts in the 
SEC.  Though this may be accomplished relatively easily by amending the 
definition of “investigative or law enforcement officer” to include SEC 
officers and attorneys,260 the lack of clarification and need to protect 
privacy interests may warrant additional changes, such as those outlined in 
this Note. 
 
 259. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
